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1. Introduction 
Utility of income, marginal utility of income and the elasticity of the marginal utility of income are 
widely used concepts in economics. For example, in analysis of welfare, game theory, choice under 
uncertainty and dynamic choice, models are formulated in terms of (time independent) utility of 
income. The utility of income is of course also basic within the theory of consumer behavior since it is 
equivalent to the indirect utility⎯as a function of income (when prices are kept fixed). Despite the 
central role utility of income plays in economics, “direct” empirical studies of how utility varies with 
income are rare.  
 In this paper we develop a stochastic model for the utility of income. By this we 
understand that the utility function depends on random error terms. The motivation for introducing 
random error components is that, (i) these terms represent unobservables as viewed by the researcher, 
(ii) the errors may be random even to the decision-maker himself in the sense that he may make 
different choices in replications of identical choice settings, cf. Quandt (1956) and Thurstone (1927). 
This notion of individual randomness is consistent with psychological experiments and the explanation 
is that the agent may find it difficult to assess a fixed utility level once and for all to the respective 
alternatives. The agent's assessments will typically vary according to his moods and whims. Another 
reason for non-anticipating fluctuations in the agent's tastes may be due to uncertainty: As new 
information appears, the agent will update his tastes accordingly.  
 A common problem with most quantitative economic models is the lack of theoretical 
justification for the choice of functional form and the distribution of unobservables. The tradition in 
economics has been to employ ad hoc assumptions with regards to functional form and the distribution 
of unobservables; alternatively to rely on non-parametric approaches1. In this paper we propose an 
alternative strategy, namely an axiomatic approach to justify the choice of functional form of the 
utility function and the distribution of unobservables. In this approach, we have adopted and modified 
ideas and principles from the literature of psychophysical measurement. Within psychophysical 
measurement there is a tradition that addresses the problem of scale representations of the relation 
between physical stimuli and sensory response. A central part of this literature is concerned with the 
interpretation and implications of specifications and laws that are invariant under admissible 
transformations of the input variables. Typically, these transformations are scale- or affine 
                                                     
1 Simon (1986):"Contemporary neoclassical economics provides no theoretical basis for specifying the shape and content of 
the utility function, and this gap is very inadequately filled by empirical research using econometric techniques. The gap is 
important because many conclusions that have been drawn in the literature about the way in which the economy operates 
depend on assumptions about consumers' utility function." 
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transformations. In fact we demonstrate how the application of invariance principles similarly to the 
ones employed in psychophysics, combined with a version of the “Independence from Irrelevant 
Alternatives” axiom, lead to explicit characterizations of functional form and the distribution of the 
random terms of the utility function. We consider these invariance principles to be intuitive and 
plausible as a theoretical rationale for restricting the class of admissible specifications, as we shall 
discuss below. 
 Our empirical analysis is based on interview data from a “Stated Preference" (SP) survey. 
We consider this type of survey data to be a promising avenue to advance beyond conventional 
econometric analysis based on market data. Recall that market data yield only one observation for 
each individual at each point in time. In contrast, SP data are generated through experiments in which 
the participants are exposed to several trials. Thus, with the SP approach the researcher can acquire 
several observations for each individual. In some cases this has enabled the researcher to formulate 
behavioral models that are estimated separately for each individual. The empirical model we specify 
and estimate is based on the corresponding theoretical model we have developed in this paper. A 
particular goodness of fit measure shows that the model fits the data rather well. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a discussion of the literature and the 
relationship between psychophysics and the measurement of utility. In section 3, we present the 
theoretical model and in section 4 we extend the model to allow for heterogeneity in preferences. 
Section 5 discusses the expenditure function that corresponds to the utility model and its distributional 
properties are examined. Section 7 and 8 present the empirical specification, estimation results and a 
specification test. Section 9 discusses the concept of cardinal utility and in section 10 we derive some 
implications for the structure of demand relations. 
2.  The measurement of utility and the link to psychophysics: a 
review 
Here we shall briefly discuss some selected works that analyze theoretical and empirical issues related 
to the measurement of sensation in general and the measurement of utility in particular. We refer to 
Ellingsen (1994) for an excellent survey of the attempts to measure utility and its variation with 
income.  
 One of the first to specify a statistical method for measuring utility was Fisher (1892, 
1918, 1927). However, to the best of our knowledge, the first one to estimate the marginal utility of 
money was Frisch (1926, 1932). Frisch (1926) introduced certain behavioral or choice axioms. The 
choice axioms Frisch referred to are of two types. The “Axioms of the first kind”, also called “Axioms 
related to a given position”, are preference ordering axioms concerning completeness, transitivity and 
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regularity and imply an ordinal utility representation. The “Axioms of the second kind”, also called 
“Axioms related to different positions”, give restrictions on the ordering of changes from one position 
in the commodity space to another and imply a cardinal utility representation, which means that 
individuals are able to compare and rank changes in the commodity space, given the reference points. 
Later, in his lectures in the 1940s, Frisch called the axioms of the second kind “Inter-local Choice 
axioms”. On several occasions Frisch expressed the view that inter-local choice axioms are highly 
plausible because most of the individuals' daily actions imply that they are in fact able to make inter-
local comparisons. Despite this strong belief in the existence of a cardinal utility function, derived 
from the axioms mentioned above, Frisch never carried out surveys where the respondents were asked 
to rank utility differences. Instead he assumed an additively separable utility function and used the 
cardinal property (cross-derivatives of the utility function are identically zero) of the utility function to 
estimate cardinal utility concepts like the marginal utility of income and the elasticity of marginal 
utility of income with respect to income, cf. Frisch (1926, 1959), and Johansen (1960). In his earliest 
work referred to above, he assumed that there exists at least one good with the property that its 
marginal utility of consumption is independent of the consumption of other goods. The additive 
assumption was never tested against market or survey data. 
 In an attempt to revitalize the cardinal utility concept and to employ utility functions to 
describe consumer behavior van Praag and numerous co-authors (hereafter called the Leyden school) 
carried out large scale surveys, see for instance van Praag (1968, 1971, 1991,1994), van Herwaarden, 
Kapteyn and van Praag (1977), van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981), Kapteyn and Wansbeck (1985). 
A discussion and critique of their approach is given in Seidl (1994) to which van Praag and Kapteyn 
responded in van Praag and Kapteyn (1994). The data they have used are typically collected through 
Income Evaluation Questions (IEQ). This means that each respondent was asked to indicate (under his 
current conditions), what income level y6 or above, of net household income per year would he 
consider to be excellent, what income interval (y5, y6) would he consider to be good, what income 
interval (y4, y5) is more than sufficient, what income interval (y3, y4) would he consider to be sufficient, 
what income interval (y2, y3) would he consider to be insufficient, what income interval (y1, y2) would 
he considered to be bad and what income level y1 or below would he consider to be very bad2. The {yj} 
represent the respective income boundaries reported by the respondents. It is assumed that the 
respondents evaluate income on the basis of the utility that they derive from income. Thus, the 
answers may be used to recover an underlying utility function. It is not implied in the IEQ scheme that 
the respondents rank utility differences and therefore additional assumptions have to be introduced in 
order to interpret the answers as yielding information about a cardinal utility function. In the Leyden 
                                                     
2 Although most questionnaires of the Leyden School used a six-level question, some studies used eight or nine levels.  
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school approach it is assumed that the so called Equal Quantile Assumption (EQA) holds. The EQA 
states that the respondents maximize informational content by letting the perceived difference in utility 
between two adjacent labels be equal. In a study by Buyze (1982), it was concluded that EQA 
provides a reasonable approximation to reality. To proceed with numerical estimates of the parameters 
of the utility function one has to specify the functional form of the utility function. In the Leyden 
school approach the utility function is assumed to have the same functional form as a log-normal 
distribution function, see van Praag (1968, 1971) and Seidl (1994) for more details. Van Herwaarden 
and Kapteyn (1981) reported the outcome of tests on 13 different functional form specifications, 
which implied that a logarithmic utility function gave a better fit than a log-normal utility function. 
However, the authors still preferred the log-normal form. The Leyden School approach has been 
criticized by Seidl (1994) who argues that key features of the employed model, such as the log-normal 
functional form of the utility function, are based on ad hoc assumptions rather than on principles 
derived from convincing axioms. Seidl (1994) concludes that instead one should apply Weber-
Fechnerian laws or Stevens’ power law in the measurement of the utility income, cf. Stevens (1975) 
and Gescheider (1997). 
 With the exception of Fisher (1892), Frisch (1929, 1932) and the Leyden School and their 
followers, economists traditionally express considerable uneasiness when confronted with the issue of 
how to measure utility. In contrast, psychologists have for a long time been concerned with both 
theoretical and empirical aspects of measuring sensory response as a function of physical stimuli such 
as intensity of sound, light, and money amounts. Within psychophysics the study of mathematical laws 
for the relation between physical stimuli (money) and sensory response (utility) seem to have started 
with Fechner (1860/1966), Thurstone (1927) and Stevens (1946, 1951). After Fechner introduced his 
psychophysical methodology in 1860 a vivid debate took place. For a summary of this debate, see 
Heidelberger (2004), ch. 6.4. According to Heidelberger, the debate centred initially on three issues; 
(i) whether Fechner’s measurement method and mathematical law for the link between stimuli and 
response are correct, (ii) whether Fechner’s law is a relation between the external stimulus and inner 
psychophysical excitation, or between sensitivity and awareness of sensation, or (as Fechner thought) 
a relation between the sensation and psychophysical activity (i.e., neural excitation), and (iii) if it is at 
all meaningful to deal with the measurement of sensations and psychological magnitudes in general. 
Mach (1886/1996) contributed to clarifying some fundamental issues. His notion of measurement is, 
in short, as follows: 
“I measure a phenomenon that I experience, meaning that I have a sensation of it as one of its features, by 
numerically representing the behavior of an external observational element serving the purpose of being a feature of 
my sensation, and this happens in such a way that the order inherent in the external feature correlates isotonically 
with the order within the sensation: If the sensation becomes stronger, the external feature also increase.”  
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From a passage in Fechner (1882/1965), where he replies to one of his critics, it seems clear that 
Mach’s point of views are completely consistent with Fechner’s interpretation, see Heidelberger 
(2004), p. 240. Our essential point here is that the Fechnerian school does not claim that the 
measurement of sensation leads to more precise knowledge of the “true” or “real essence” of sensation 
or to have identified objectivity in subjectivity. It is only claimed that in one particular aspect one has 
found a way to understand the relation between sensation and the exterior world.  
 The arguments of Fechner and Mach are also valid for the measurement of utility. 
Certainly, our utility concept is not meant to represent some sort of psychological happiness or states 
of fulfilment in a deep existential sense, or notions along such lines. Similarly to Fechner’s and 
Stevens’ psychophysical law, utility is only meant to represent peoples judgments about ordering 
sensations of stimuli on an ordinal scale (quantities of goods), or similarly, representing sensations of 
changes in stimuli on a ratio or interval scale (changes of quantities of goods).  
 In contrast to Fechner's logarithmic law, Stevens (1957, 1975) proposed the “power law”, 
which is claimed to represent the link between stimulus and sensation. To substantiate this claim 
Stevens has presented both theoretical arguments as well as an impressive amount of empirical results 
from laboratory type experiments. See also Gescheider and Bolanowski (1991a,b).  
 There are several different types of survey questionnaires applied by Stevens and his 
followers to obtain SP data, cf. Falmagne (1985) and Gescheider (1997). One frequently applied 
method is called Magnitude estimation. In a typical magnitude estimation experiment, questions such 
as the following are asked: “Suppose you are given 1000 US dollars. How much more money will you 
need to increase your utility by 20 per cent?” The initial stimulus 1000 $ is called the standard 
modulus, or simply a standard. In another version of the method no standard is provided. The subject 
is simply asked to assign to any stimulus presented any number that seem suitable as an estimate of the 
sensation magnitude. Yet another method is labeled Production and matching. Here the subject is 
requested to react to stimuli (money) by “producing” a value of a sensory variable, for example, by 
turning a dial. There are several versions of this method. In a version called Magnitude production the 
procedure used in magnitude estimation is reversed. Thus, the subject is given a number and asked to 
produce a matching intensity of the stimulus. In a second version called Ratio production the subject is 
instructed to adjust the intensity of the stimulus in such a manner that it appears to be a particular 
multiple or fraction of a standard. For example, the subject may be asked to produce a tone intensity 
appearing one third as loud as the standard tone of the same frequency. A third version is called Cross-
modality matching. In this method two experiments based on magnitude estimation are conducted 
first. For example, the two sensory continua may be loudness and brightness. Second, the subject is 
requested to directly match the values from one sensory continuum to the other.  
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 At first glance such methods may seem strange and ill suited to obtain sensible results in 
economics. The reason why is the convention, established purely by habit, that agents are only able to 
make ordinal rank orderings and that only observations of actual choices, that is, market data can be 
trusted. Many economists typically believe that agents reveal their “true preferences” only under 
market like conditions; i.e., when financial incentives matter3. A good illustration of the skepticism 
among economists as regards laboratory type SP- experiments based on questionnaires is reported in 
Sen (1982, p. 9): 
“One reason for the tendency in economics to concentrate only on “revealed preference” relations is a 
methodological suspicion regarding introspective concepts. Choice is seen as information, whereas introspection is 
not open to observation. ... Even as behaviorism this is particular limited since verbal behavior (or writing behavior, 
including response to questionnaires) should not lie outside the scope of the behaviorist approach.” 
 In a large number of experiments Stevens and his followers have demonstrated that their 
data, which are consistent with the power law and different experimental methods, such as the ones 
described above, yield consistent results. Perhaps the most startling result is that in the cross-modality 
matching method subjects are not only capable of performing the task requested in such experiments 
without much difficulty, but they also produce reasonably regular data. It seems however, to have been 
overlooked by Stevens and his followers that results obtained by methods that depend on a standard, 
such as Magnitude estimation, not necessarily will be independent of the chosen standard. Morover, 
one cannot be sure that the data obtained are independent of the order in which stimuli are presented 
(commutativity property). These problems were pointed out by Narens (1996), and tests were carried 
out by Ellermeier and Faulhammer (2000) who found that the commutativity property seems to hold 
but that results do indeed depend on the standard. 
 Clearly, the IEQ approach of the Leyden School is a version of Magnitude production, 
where instead of numbers, the subject is given questions that are supposed to represent utility levels. 
Hence, in this case no standard is used, and consequently Narens' critique should not be relevant for 
analyses based on questionaires such as the one we use in this study. However, results may depend 
indirectly on a "reference standard", namely current income and possibly other conditions of the 
household. This is indeed confirmed by the Leyden School and it is also found in the empirical 
analysis of this paper. 
 With Stevens’ results as a point of departure, Luce (1959b) took an important step 
towards formulating a suitable formal theory from which laws such as the power function can be 
shown to follow. In the last four decades several authors have been following up this line of research 
                                                     
3 Smith (1990): "Although replication using cash payoffs (where this has not been done) is certainly needed, I think it is 
mistake to assume that the economist's paradigm will somehow be rescued in the context of these experimental designs, if 
experimenters would just pay money." 
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and there exists now a considerable body of literature where explicit functional form characterization- 
and restrictions are obtained from surprisingly general invariance principles, such as for example the 
requirement of scale invariance as argued by Stevens, see Stevens (1946,1951,1957,1975). A good 
reference source to this kind of theories is the book by Falmagne (1985).  
 In the context of random utility models, an early contribution within the tradition of 
Fechnerian psychophysics is Thurstone (1927). Thurstone conducted choice- and psychophysical 
experiments among students and often found that some students would make different choices when 
choice experiments where replicated. To account for the variability of responses in choice 
experiments, Thurstone proposed a model based on the idea that a stimulus induces a “psychological 
state”, which is a realization of a random variable. From this idea he was led to formulate a random 
utility model, that is, to represent preferences over alternatives by random variables (random utilities), 
in which the individual decision-maker would choose the alternative with the highest value of the 
random variable. He assumed that these random utilities were normally distributed. In the binary 
choice setting this setup yields the so-called Probit choice model.  
 Further important contributions to the theory of stochastic choice models were made in 
the 1950s and subsequent decades. Luce (1959a) introduced his famous choice axiom, “Independence 
from Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA), and demonstrated that this axiom is equivalent to a model that 
determines choice probabilities in a multinomial setting as a simple function of the choice set (set of 
feasible alternatives) and of alternative-specific response strengths (representative utilities); the so-
called Luce model. Later Holman and Marley (see Luce and Suppes, 1965) demonstrated that the Luce 
model is indeed consistent with an additive random utility model in which the representative utilities 
in the Luce model can be interpreted as the respective deterministic parts of the corresponding random 
utilities and where the (additive) error terms are i.i. extreme value distributed.  
 Among economists, an early contribution in the tradition of Fechnerian psychophysics is 
due to Debreu (1958). Without relying on a random utility formulation he considered a stochastic 
choice setting with binary choice probabilities that were assumed to satisfy certain conditions. Given 
these conditions he and other researchers (cf. Falmagne, 1985, and Suppes et al., 1989) demonstrated 
that they imply a (deterministic) cardinal utility representation of the choice probabilities in the sense 
that the binary choice probabilities can be expressed as a monotone function (cumulative distribution 
function) of the utility difference. This cumulative distribution function is unique apart from a scale 
transformation of the argument4. McFadden (1973), Yellott (1977) and Strauss (1979) provided 
important characterizations of random utility models satisfying IIA. In particular, they showed that 
                                                     
4 Debreu (1958) only proved the existence of the cardinal utility function and did not discuss the c.d.f. linking the utility 
function to the binary choice probabilities. The relationship between the cardinal utility function and the binary choice 
probabilities was established by Falmagne (1985). 
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under different regularity conditions, the additive random utility model with independent random 
terms is consistent with IIA only when the error terms are extreme value distributed. McFadden (1978, 
1981) extended the Luce model by introducing the Generalized Extreme Value model (GEV), which 
contains the nested logit models as a special case. The motivation for this extension is that IIA may 
not hold when the same latent aspects characterize several alternatives. The GEV model is derived 
from an additive random utility model where the joint distribution of the error terms is a multivariate 
extreme value distribution. Dagsvik (1994,1995) has demonstrated that any random utility model can 
be approximated arbitrarily closely by GEV models. Thus the general GEV allows a very rich pattern 
of correlation between the error terms. Consequently, the GEV framework can be applied in choice 
setting where the IIA property is questionable. Similarly, the Probit model of Thurstone has been 
extended to the multinomial choice setting in which the utilities have multinormally distributed error 
terms. Through the development of appropriate econometric theory tailor-made for this type of models 
and through a large number of applications (cf. McFadden, 2001), McFadden and others have 
demonstrated that the random utility framework is very useful for econometric analysis. We refer to 
Anderson et al. (1992) and Fishburn (1998) for more detailed reviews of stochastic choice models. 
3. The model 
We consider a general choice setting in which the consumer makes choices of quantities of 
consumption bundles as well as discrete choices among variants of differentiated products and other 
qualitative alternatives (such as type of work, schooling and transportation modes). The discrete 
alternatives are indexed by (j, r), where ,jr C j∈ ∈Ω , and { }jC  are disjoint sets. Thus, the sets 
{ ,jC j ∈Ω } represent a partition of the universal set of discrete alternatives. The sets { jC } and Ω  are 
possibly infinite. A good example of this structure of the set of alternatives is the case of differentiated 
products. In this example the index set Ω  represents an enumeration of products while the subset jC  
is the set of variants of product j. We assume that the degree of similarity between product variants of 
different products is independent of which products are compared. However, we make no assumptions 
about the degree of similarity between alternatives within each set jC . Let y denote the agent’s 
income, and let ( ),%U j y  denote the conditional indirect utility given that the discrete alternative 
belongs to ,jC j ∈Ω . Thus, ( ),U j y% is the utility of the most preferred consumption bundle and 
product variant, given product type j and given income y and prices. For notational simplicity we have 
suppressed the price vector in the notation of ( ),U j y% . We shall assume that the utility function is 
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random and y γ≥ , where γ is interpreted as a subsistence level that may be specific to the agent. Let B 
be the family of all finite subsets of Ω. 
3.1. The individual utility function as a stochastic process 
In this section we shall introduce behavioral assumptions that will enable us to characterize the 
stochastic properties of the utility function. To this end we shall distinguish between “Conditions” and 
“Axioms”. By an axiom we understand assumptions that can be supported by a clear behavioral 
intuition, in contrast to regularity conditions that do not necessarily have a behavioral interpretation.  
 
 Axiom 1 
 The conditional indirect utility processes ( ){ }, , ,U j y y jγ≥ ∈Ω% , are independent max-
stable processes (with y as parameter) with standard Fréchet marginals. 
 
 Recall that a max-stable process has finite dimensional distributions which are 
multivariate extreme value distributions. The Fréchet distributions (also known as the type I extreme 
value distributions), defined on R+, have one-dimensional marginal distributions equal to ( )exp abx−−  
for 0x >  and 0a >  and 0b > . When 1a b= =  we call it the standard Fréchet distribution. 
 The reason why we call the assumption above an axiom is because it is motivated by the 
“Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption (IIA). Specifically, McFadden (1973) and 
Yellott (1977)  showed that IIA is equivalent to a choice model that can be represented by additive 
independent random utilities with type III extreme value distributed random terms5. Recall also that 
Dagsvik (1995) has demonstrated that in the absence of state dependence effects and transaction costs 
there is no loss of generality in restricting the utility processes to max-stable processes. This is so 
because the “multiperiod” random utility model (with income y as parameter) can be approximated 
arbitrarily closely by random utility models generated from max-stable processes. It is therefore the 
requirement of independence in Axiom 1 that yields the essential restriction. For a summary of the 
properties of multivariate extreme value distribution functions, we refer to Resnick (1987). 
 Axiom 1 implies that one can, for each given y, write 
(1) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )U j y v j y j yε=% %%  
                                                     
5 Note that a multiplicative random utility model with Fréchet distributed error terms is equivalent to a corresponding 
additive random utility model with type III extreme value distributed error terms. 
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for j ∈Ω , where ( )v ⋅%  is a positive deterministic mapping from [ ),λΩ× ∞  to R+ and ( , )j yε%  is a 
random variable that is standard Fréchet distributed. 
 For a given income y and a given choice set { }1,2,...,B m= ∈B , let ( )BJ y denote the 
index of the preferred attribute in B, i.e., 
 ( ) ( )( ) , max , .B r BJ y j U j y U r y∈= ⇔ =% %  
 
 Axiom 2 (DIM) 
 For B ∈B  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), , , .Br B r BP maxU r y u J x x y P maxU r y u∈ ∈≤ ≤ = ≤% %  
 
 Axiom 2 states that the conditional distribution of the indirect utility at income y, given 
the index of the preferred alternative at any income x, x y≤ , equals the unconditional distribution of 
the indirect utility. 
 For x y= , Axiom 2 is a version of the DIM property (Distribution is Invariant of which 
variable attains the Maximum), proposed by Strauss (1979). He did, however, not produce any 
behavioral motivation to support it. Note that it is understood here that preferences are exogenous, as 
conventionally assumed in economics. This means that utilities are not affected by previous choice 
experience. For the case x y= , our motivation for DIM is as follows: The values of the alternatives 
are fully captured by the corresponding utilities and the indirect utility is the utility of the chosen 
alternative. Once the highest utility has been attained the information about which alternative that 
yields maximum utility does not represent additional information that is relevant for the value of the 
indirect utility. Moreover, Axiom 2 states that preferred alternatives under income less than y should 
be irrelevant for the evaluation of the highest utility at income y. This is so because the alternatives 
available at income x also are available at income y when .x y≤  Consequently, the "information" 
about the preferences over consumption possibilities that are restricted by income y includes the 
corresponding information when income is less than y.  
 DIM represents of course an idealization that cannot be expected to hold exactly in many 
real life situations. For example, it is clear that in many real life choice settings preferences may 
indeed be influenced by choice experience. Note moreover, that, a priori, it is not evident that there 
exist stochastic utility processes which satisfy DIM. However, if we can find utility processes that 
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satisfy DIM, then this will be useful for obtaining a representation of preferences in idealized choice 
settings (under DIM).  
 
 Axiom 3 
 The conditional indirect utility processes ( ){ }, ,U j y y γ≥% , j∈Ω, are non-decreasing in y 
with probability one. The probability that the utility process is constant in any given income interval is 
positive. 
 
 Axiom 3 means that there is a positive probability (possibly rather small) that the agent's 
utility of alternative j will remain constant even if income increases. Thus, if we consider two incomes 
y2 and y1, where 2 1y y> , there is a positive probability that ( ) ( )2 1, ,U j y U j y= . This property is 
consistent with the famous notion in psychophysics called “just noticeable differences”. Within 
economics an early discussion on this is found in Quandt (1956):  
 “…that the consumer is often ignorant of the exact state of his preferences and he is frequently insensitive to small 
changes or differences in stimuli. As a result, a small movement in any direction from any initial position may 
leave the consumer as well off as before. It might be suggested that we deal with this problem by considering an 
indifference map consisting not of indifference curves but of indifference bands…” 
The intuition for the property is that, in an observationally homogenous population, an increase of 
income from 1y  to 2y  (say) may not make everybody better off. This is because this income increase 
may, for some consumers, not be sufficient for them to switch to a new commodity group, or be able 
to buy another indivisible consumer good that makes them better off. (See Patel and Subrahmanyam, 
1978, for a similar argument). It is important to realize that the notion of randomness and indifferences 
with respect to small changes in income is meant to represent a consumer's typical behavior in choice 
situations. For example, when asked if one dollar more a day is better than status quo in a SP 
questionnaire, most persons will probably answer yes. However, a question like that will be 
misleading because it is not put in the appropriate context, namely in typical daily life choice settings. 
Quandt's point is that in daily life behavior, few persons may care about having a few dollars more or 
less. Note that our stochastic framework also allows for the following interpretation, on the individual 
level: an individual that participates in a replication of a choice experiment may in some cases be 
indifferent between y1 and y2, and in other cases strictly prefer y2 over y1.  
 The next condition is a mathematical regularity condition. 
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 Condition 1 
 The conditional indirect utility processes{ }( , ), ,U j y y jγ Ω≥ ∈% , are separable and 
continuous in probability.  
 
 The separability requirement is very weak and does not represent any essential restriction. 
We refer to textbooks in probability theory for a definition of this concept. The continuity requirement 
means that the probability that  
 ( ) ( )1 2, ,U j y U j y η− >% % ,  
where 0η >  is an arbitrarily given number, decreases toward zero when 2 1y y−  tends to zero. This 
means that when 1y  is close to 2y , there are "very few" sample paths where 1 2( , ) ( , )U j y U j y−% %  is 
“large”.  
 
 Theorem 1 
 If condition 1 and Axioms 1 to 3 hold, then ( ){ }, ,U j y y γ≥%  is an extremal process, that 
is, it can be represented as 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 2, max , , ,jU j y U j y V y y=% %  
with ( ), 0U j γ =% , where ( ){ }1 2 1 2, ,jV y y y y≤  are random variables such that ( )1 2,jV y y  is 
independent of ( )1 2,jV y y′ ′  if [ ] [ ]1 2 1 2, ,y y y y′ ′∩ = ∅ , ( )1 1, 0jV y y =  and 
(3) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 11 2 , ,, expj v j y v j yP V y y u u
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟≤ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
% %
 
for 0u >  and 2 1y y≥ . 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in the Appendix. Note that if ( , ) 0v j y =%  for y γ< , then 
also ( , ) 0U j y =% . 
 The class of extremal processes is well known in the statistical literature and has been 
studied extensively by many authors, see for example Resnick (1987). At first glance, the result of 
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Theorem 1 may seem strange. However, as demonstrated in the example below, the class of extremal 
utility processes can be given an intuitive behavioral interpretation.  
 
 Example: 
 In this example, we discuss a direct utility representation that is consistent with the result 
of Theorem 1. To this end let x denote a vector of quantities of a consumption bundle and let ( )* ,U x j  
denote the corresponding direct utility of (x,j) where j represents the set Cj, as discussed before. In 
modern markets and stores consumption bundles are usually made available as combinations of 
“packages” with given quantities. Thus, in this case the set of available quantities is countable. Let 
, 1,2,...,rx r =  be an arbitrary enumeration of the consumption bundles, and suppose that 
 ( ) ( ) ( )* , ( ) ,r rU x j m x b j r jε=  
where m(⋅) and b(⋅) are positive deterministic functions and ( ){ },r jε  are i.i.d. random error terms 
with standard Fréchet cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.). The budget constraint is given by 
 r jpx q y+ ≤  
where p is a vector of goods prices and qj is the cost of alternative j. As a result, the conditional 
indirect utility ( ),U j y%  can be written as 
(4) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), max * , ( ) max ( , ).
r j r j
r r r r
px y q px y q
U j y U x j b j m x r jε
≤ − ≤ −
= =%  
Define 
(5) ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2, max * ,
r j
j r r
y px c y
V y y U x j
< + ≤
= .  
It follows immediately from (4) and (5) that 
(6) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 2, max , , ,jU j y U j y V y y=% %   
for 1 2y y≤ . Furthermore, our distributional assumptions imply that ( )1,U j y%  is independent of 
( )1 2,jV y y  and that ( )1 2,jV y y  has Fréchet c.d.f. Thus, we have shown that extremal utility processes 
have an intuitive interpretation.  
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 As above, let B be the agent’s choice set which we assume belongs to B , and let 
 ( )
,
( ) max , .
≤ ∈
=
%
jc y j B
U y U j y  
The process { }( ),U y y γ≥  is the utility-of-income (indirect utility) process. Although U(y) depends 
on B, we drop B in the notation for simplicity. 
 The next result is immediate. 
 
 Corollary 1 
 The utility of income is an extremal process that can be expressed as 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 2max , ,U y U y V y y=   
for 1 2y y≤ , where 
 ( ) ( )
1 2
1 2 1 2,
, max ,
j
jy c y j B
V y y V y y
≤ ≤ ∈
= . 
The c.d.f. of ( )1 2,V y y  is given by 
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 11 2, exp v y v yP V y y u u
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟≤ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
for 0u > , where 
 ( ) ( )
,
,
jc y j B
v y v j y
< ∈
= ∑ % . 
 
 Since ( ) 0v γ = , it follows from (2) and (3) that 
 ( ) ( )( ) exp v yP U y u
u
⎛ ⎞≤ = −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
for 0u > , which means that we can write 
 ( ) ( ) ( )U y v y yε=  
where ε(y) is standard Fréchet distributed. 
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3.2. Functional form of the deterministic part of the utility function 
In this section we postulate an axiom that enables us to derive important restrictions on the functional 
form of the deterministic part of the utility of income. 
 
 Axiom 4 
 Suppose that * *1 2 1 2y , y , y , y  are equal to or greater than γ  and such that 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *2 1 2 1P U y >U y < P U y >U y . 
Then for all 0λ >  
 ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )* *2 1 2 1P U y >U y < P U y >U y .λ γ γ λ γ γ λ γ γ λ γ γ− + − + − + − +  
 
 The interpretation of Axiom 4 is that if the fraction of consumers that strictly prefers 2y  
to 1y  is less than the fraction of consumers that strictly prefers 
*
2y  to 
*
1y , then this inequality does not 
change when all incomes beyond the subsistence level are multiplied by an arbitrary positive constant 
λ. The intuition is as follows: associate the different income levels * *1 2 1 2, , ,y y y y  with consumption 
profiles 1, 2, 1*, 2* (when prices are given) and suppose the fraction of individuals that prefer 
consumption profile 2 over 1 is less than the fraction of individual that prefer 2* over 1*. To the 
consumers income beyond subsistence matters to some extent in the sense that a scale transformation 
of the respective incomes beyond subsistence will affect utility levels, but not in such a way that the 
fraction of consumers that prefer consumption profile 2 over profile 1 will be greater than the fraction 
of consumers that prefer consumption profile 2* over profile 1*. Recall that in our setup the probability 
that ( ) ( )2 1U y U y> , for 2 1y y> , is not equal to one because there is a positive probability that 
( ) ( )2 1U y U y= . We realize that if satiation can happen then evidently Axiom 4 may not hold. 
Dagsvik and Røine (2005) have carried out tests of Axioms 3 and 4 based on SP data and found that 
these axioms are supported by the data. 
 
 Theorem 2 
 Assume that Condition 1 and Axioms 1 to 4 hold and that v(⋅) defined in Corollary 1 is 
continuous and strictly increasing in y, y γ≥ . Then v(y) has the structure 
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(8) 
( )
v
y - - 1
(y)= exp
τγ
κ δ
τ
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
for y γ≥ , where τ and 00, δ κ> >  are constants.  
 
 The proof of Theorem 2 is given in the Appendix. Note that the parameter τ  is allowed 
to be negative. 
 
 Axiom 5 
 For any 2 1y y> , and 0λ >  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ).2 1 2P U y U y P U y U y1λ γ γ λ γ γ> = − + > − +  
 
 Axiom 5 is stronger than Axiom 4, and it means that income beyond subsistence level is 
perceived in a strict relative sense, that is, the fraction of consumers that are better off when incomes 
beyond subsistence is increased from 1y γ−  to ( )1yλ γ−  and 2y γ−  to ( )2yλ γ−  is independent of 
λ. Note that this property is not implied by Axiom 4. 
 
 Theorem 3 
 Assume that Condition 1 and Axioms 1 to 3 and 5 hold and that v(⋅) is continuous and 
strictly increasing in y, y γ≥ . Then v(y) has the structure 
(9) ( )( )v y y δκ γ= −   
for y γ≥ , and 00, δ κ> >  
 
 A proof of Theorem 3 is given in the Appendix. 
 
 We note that (9) is obtained as a special case of (8) when 0τ → . 
4. Heterogeneity in preferences 
In the empirical specification to be described in Section 6 below, we shall introduce observed 
covariates that may affect the individual’s evaluation of income. These observed covariates may 
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capture some of the heterogeneity in the population, but obviously not all. To account for the 
remaining unobserved heterogeneity, we will introduce an individual specific effect, known to the 
agent but not to the analyst. Specifically, we shall assume that the systematic part of the utility 
function contains a positive multiplicative component that is a constant for each individual agent but 
varies across the population according to some probability distribution (random effect). Thus, the 
utility function, modified to include this random effect becomes 
(10) ( ) ( ) ( )U y Wv y yε=  
where W is the random effect. Note that the way we include W is analogous to allowing for an additive 
constant term in an additive separable utility representation (which is seen by taking logarithm in  
(10)). This multiplicative random effect is motivated by the functional form given in (8), with 
κ containing a multiplicative random effect. Recall that W is irrelevant for individual choice behavior 
since it cancels out in utility comparisons. However, it matters in our context in which data are 
generated by the Leyden School type of SP data that yield information about utility evaluations across 
individuals.  
 In this section, we shall propose a theoretical justification for the distribution of W. For 
the sake of notational precision in the following Axiom, let us introduce individual specific notation, 
i.e,. let ( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i iU y W v y yε= , be the utility of agent i. 
 
 Axiom 6 
 Let the incomes of every individual in the population S be given. Then 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )max max max maxi i r r r r r r i i r rr S r A r S r AP U y U y U y U y P U y U y∈ ∈ ∈ ∈= = = =  
for A S⊂ . 
 
 The statement in Axiom 6 says that the probability that individual i has the highest utility 
in S, given that this individual belongs to a subset A that contains the individual with the highest 
utility, is equal to the probability that i has the highest utility within A. In other words, given that the 
highest ranked individual belongs to A, information about the ranking of the individuals within S\A is 
irrelevant for assessing who is the highest ranked individual in A. We recognize Axiom 6 as a 
particular version of IIA. We note that Axiom 6 requires that individual utilities can be compared and 
ranked.  
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 Theorem 4 
 Assume that Condition 1 and Axioms 1 to 4 and 6 hold, and that Wi and ( )i iyε  are 
independent, i S∈ . Then the distribution of Wi is strictly α-stable and totally skew to the right with 
1α < . 
 
 Recall that the family of α-stable distributions, often denoted by {Sα(c, β, µ)}, is 
characterized by four parameters, namely ( , , , )cα β µ , where 0 2α< ≤  represents the tail thickness 
and is called the characteristic exponent, 0c > , is a scale parameter, [ ]1,1β ∈ −  is a skewness 
parameter and µ is a location parameter. When 2α = , one obtains as a special case the normal 
distribution. It is strictly α-stable when 0µ =  and totally skew to the right when 1β = . When 1α ≤ , 
neither the variance nor the mean of the stable random variable exist. When 0µ = , 1α < and 1β =  the 
probability that the stable random variable attains non-positive values is zero. (See Samorodnitsky and 
Taqqu, 1994). 
 As mentioned in Section 3, the choice among characteristics will, under Axiom 1, satisfy 
IIA. This is still true if (10) holds because the random effect W vanishes in utility comparisons. In our 
context, IIA does not seem overly restrictive since the characteristics have not been given an explicit 
empirical content. It is however possible to motivate more general representations of unobserved 
heterogeneity. This extension consists in assuming that the utility representation has the form  
(11) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) , ,U j y W j v j y j yε=% % %% , 
where { }( ),W j j ∈Ω% are strictly stable processes that are totally skew to the right with 1α < . It can be 
demonstrated that (11) implies that the choice of characteristics model will have a Generalized 
Extreme Value (GEV) structure. According to Dagsvik (1994, 1995) the GEV model represents in 
practice no restriction on the general random utility model. Our conjecture is that Axiom 6 implies that 
{ }( ),W j j ∈Ω%  is a stable process. However, we have so far only been able to prove that the one-
dimensional marginal distributions of this process are stable. For simplicity, in this paper we have 
chosen to base our empirical model on the special case (10) rather than on (11).  
5. The random Expenditure Function 
Let the random expenditure functions { }( ), 0Y u u > be defined by 
 ( ) min{ : ( ) }Y u y U y u= ≥ . 
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Due to the fact that the indirect utility function U(y) is a stochastic process with parameter y defined in 
Theorem 1, we have the following results. 
 
 Theorem 5 
 Assume that (2) and (3) hold. For ... ,1 2 m0 < u u u≤ ≤ ≤  and ...1 2 my y yγ ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤ , we 
have 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ), ,..., , ,..., , ,...,m 1 2 m 1 1 2 2 m m 1 2 mG y y y P Y u y Y u y Y u y = E exp WH y y y≡ > > > −  
where 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,..., m 11 1 11 2 m m m j j j 1
j 1
H y y y v y u v y u u
−
− − −
+
=
= + −∑ . 
For ...1 2 my y y< < <  and 1 2 mu u u≤ ≤ ≤L , the corresponding joint density of 
( ) ( ) ( )( ), ,...,1 2 mY u Y u Y u  exists and is equal to 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ), ,..., , ,..., .m 1-1 1 1 mm 1 2 m m m j j 1 j 1 2 m
j 1
g y y y v y u u u v y E W exp WH y y y
−
− −
+
=
′ ′= − −∏  
 
 A proof of Theorem 5 is given in Appendix. 
 
 It turns out to be convenient to normalize the scale parameter c in the stable distribution 
of the random effect W such that  
(12) ( )1/ cos / 2 .cα απ=   
This is purely a matter of convenience and represents no loss of generality since the scale parameter in 
the distribution of W cannot be identified. 
 The next lemma is essential for calculating 1 2( exp( ( , , , )))
m
mE W WH y y y− L when m=6. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Let W be α-stable, ( ), ,S c 1α 0  with 1α <  and c given in (12). Let ( );ψ λ α  be defined as 
 ( ) ( )( ); 6E W exp Wψ λ α λ≡ −  
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for 0λ ≥ . Then for 0,λ >  
(13) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
6
2 6 3 2 6
4 3 2 6
5 5 5 5 5 6
5 13 10 17 15( 6 25 36 15)
(31 225 595 675 274)
( 15 85 225 274 120) .
66 1
3
2 2
; = E W exp W 15 1-
exp
α 5 5α
4 4α 3α
α
α α
ψ λ α λ αλ α α λ
α α α λ α α α α λ
α α α α α λ
α α α α α αλ λ
− −
− −
−
−
⎡
− = +⎢⎣
+ − + + − + − +
+ − + − +
⎤+ − + − + − + −⎦
 
 
 Proof: 
 From the properties of α-stable distributions it follows that 
(14) ( ) ( )exp expE W αλ λ− = − . 
By differentiating (14) six times with respect to λ we get (13). 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Corollary 2 
 The structure of ( )2 1 2G y , y  implies that we can write 
(15) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 211 2
2 1
,
min ,v
( - )
u u u u
Y u Y u
u u W
η
−
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
    
for 2 1u u> , where ( ),1 2u uη  is a random variable, which is exponentially distributed with parameter 
equal to one, and is independent of W and ( )2Y u . 
 
 The proof of Corollary 2 follows readily since any finite dimensional marginal 
distribution functions of the process { }( ), 0Y u u > , given by (15), are the same as the ones given by 
Theorem 5. 
 
 Corollary 3 
 The structure of G1(y) implies that we can write 
 ( ) 1/( ) ( )v Y u u u αη=  
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for 0u > , where ( )uη  is a random variable that is exponentially distributed with parameter equal to 
one. 
 
 The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the Appendix. 
6. Empirical specification 
Consistent with the result of Theorem 5, let ( ),1,0W S cα , where c is given in (12). In the following 
it will be convenient to reparametrize the model by introducing { }ja  defined by  
(16) 
1
1 1logj
j j
a
u u +
⎛ ⎞
= − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
for 5j ≤  and 6 6loga u= , where { }ju  are unknown utility threshold levels associated with the ordered 
structure of the income questionnaire we are using. We suspect that households may have different 
threshold levels. We allowed initially ja to depend on selected household specific characteristics such 
as income, debt and family size, etc. However, the estimation results indicated that only income 
seemed to have a significant effect on these threshold levels. Motivated by these preliminary results, 
we assume that log( )j ja d t I= + , where I denotes the current household income level. From Theorem 
5, (8) (with δ = 1/σ) and Lemma 1 we get that 
(17) 
{ }( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
6 1 2 6 1 1 2 2 6 6
6
1
, ,..., | , ,...,
1
,exp exp
j
j
j
j
aG y y y P Y u y Y u y Y u y
y
a
α
τγ
τσ
=
≡ ≥ ≥ ≥
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞
− −⎢ ⎪ ⎪ ⎥⎜ ⎟= − −⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
∑  
and 
(18) 
{ }( )
( ) ( ) ( )
6 1 2 6
1
6 6
11
, ,..., |
1 1
exp exp ; ,
j
j j j
j j
jj
ag y y y
y y y
a a
τ τ τγ γ γ
ψ α
τσ σ τσ
−
==
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
− − − − −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟= − ⋅ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑∏
 
where 1 6...y yγ < < < . Unfortunately, the functional form of the density function in (18) implies that 
standard conditions for maximum likelihood estimation are not fulfilled. The difficulty here is that the 
support of the density in (18) depends on parameters of the specification of the subsistence level γ . In 
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the simple case where subsistence level is a constant, the global maximum of the likelihood function is 
achieved at 1min( ( ))ˆ iY uγ = and 0τ = . However, there may be an additional local maximum. Barnard 
(1965) has given reasons for ignoring the singular solution and settle for the local one (if it exists). In 
the statistical literature the estimation of densities like (18) when γ  is unknown does not seem to have 
been analyzed. Zanakis and Kyparisis (1986), and Smith (1994) only discuss special cases of (18). In 
the estimation procedure below we have therefore chosen to specify the subsistence level a priori. In 
particular, we assume that the subsistence level γ for the household is defined as 30000Nγ = ⋅ , 
where N  is the household size. Here, 30000 NOK (as of 1995, one USD is approximately equal to 
7.20 Norwegian Kroner) is assumed to be the subsistence level for a single individual, and N  is 
used as the household equivalent scale. This type of household equivalence scale is used in many 
countries. 
7. Data and parameter estimates 
In September 1995 a questionnaire was distributed to 569 employees at Statistics Norway and the staff 
at the Department of Economics, University of Oslo. It contained questions concerning the social 
background of the respondent, including income and wealth, and the income evaluation question 
similarly to the ones of the Leyden school quoted in Section 2. Let {yj} denote the individual's answers 
of the questionnaire, that is (y1, y2), (y2, y3), …, (y5, y6) are the income intervals that correspond to the 
IEQ questionnaire discussed in section 26. Consistent to the theoretical setup above, we assume that 
the observed income levels are related to the utility levels through the expenditure function as 
( )j jy Y u=  where ju  is the underlying utility level that corresponds to income yj . That is, yj is the 
lowest disposable income needed to achieve utility level ju . The response rate was slightly above 50 
per cent. 250 of those who responded were able to fill in answers on all the income intervals in the 
income evaluation questionnaire, with 1j jy y+ >  for all j and positive reported household income. 
 Obviously, this sample is not representative for the Norwegian population. The majority 
of the respondents are individuals with high education. In addition they work in similar public 
institutions and therefore have similar incomes. Table 2 gives a summary picture of some basic 
characteristics of the sample. The loglikelihood function is obtained from (18) by inserting the 
respective observed individual levels ( ) , 1,2,...,6jY u j = , for each individual in the sample.  
 
                                                     
6 We have dropped the indexation for the individuals for notation simplicity. 
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Table 1. Income Evaluation Questions. All numbers are in NOK as of September 1995 
Utility level ju  Disposable Income Mean    Std.    Minimum  Maximum 
Bad ( )1Y u  160428 76268 30000  500000  
Insufficient ( )2Y u  203776 91260 50000  600000  
Sufficient ( )3Y u  247452 110469 70000  700000  
More than Sufficient  ( )4Y u  296180 131622 100000  800000  
Good ( )5Y u  349212 155918 120000  1000000  
Very good ( )6Y u  435932 214094 140000  1500000  
# observations  250      
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. We observe that the parameters are sharply determined. 
Although the Box-Cox exponent τ is significantly different from zero, the estimate of the exponent is 
only slightly above zero. Thus, the deterministic part of the utility function is found to be 
approximately a power function, given the family of functions specified in (8). Our results thus are 
consistent with the assumption of Theorem 3.  The characteristic exponent α is significantly below 1 
as expected and thus neither the mean nor the variance exists in the distribution of W. As to be 
expected the constants {dj} are increasing with utility levels. The coefficient t is estimated to be 
positive and significantly different from zero, which means that the threshold levels are increasing 
with the actual income of the household.   
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of basic characteristics of the sample 
 Mean Std. Minimum Maximum 
Family size 2.40 1.31 1  6 
# children less than 6 0.31 0.62 0  3 
# children between 7 and 15 0.28 0.59 0  2 
# children above 16 0.16 0.48 0  3 
Education Years 16.39 3.09 8 24 
Income (100 000 NOK) 3.67 2.03 0.3 19 
Number of Individual with positive debt 217   
Debt (those with positive debt, 100 000 NOK) 4.88 3.66 0.05 21 
# of observations 250   
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 As mentioned in Section 2, the Leyden School approach is based on the assumption that 
individuals partition the income range according to equal quantiles of the utility function, referred to 
as EQA. Buyze (1982) tested this assumption empirically and concluded that the assumption holds 
approximately. Within our framework it is also possible to test EQA. Specifically, we have used the 
likelihood ratio test to test whether or not EQA is rejected for our dataset. Note that in our setting, our 
utility is measured in ratio scale so the equal quantile assumption implies: 
 1 1 2 2
1 1
( ) ( )
, for 1,..., 4
( ) ( )
j j j j
j j j j
U y u U y u
j
U y u U y u
ρ+ + + +
+ +
= = = = =  
 From Table 3 we see that twice the difference between the a priori loglikelihood function 
and the loglikelihood function under EQA equals 3.4. The corresponding critical value of the Chi-
square distribution with four degrees of freedom equals 9.5. Thus we cannot reject EQA. We observe 
that the estimates of the key parameters { }, ,τ σ α are the same in the two models, the general model 
and the model under EQA.  
 
Table 3. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of the utility of income 
 General model Model under EQA 
Variables/parameters Estimates Std. Estimates Std. 
Box-Cox exponent τ 0.048 0.020 0.037 0.019 
Dispersion parameter σ 0.166 0.004 0.166 0.004 
Characteristic exponent α 0.328 0.015 0.332 0.015 
Constant level 1, d1 0.364 0.307   
Constant level 2, d2 1.729 0.310   
Constant level 3, d3 3.048 0.317   
Constant level 4, d4 4.372 0.326   
Transformed 
utility levels 
logj ja d t I= +  
Constant level 5, d5 5.723 0.339   
 Constant level 6, d6 7.545 0.362 7.365 0.300 
 Log income, t 1.517 0.194 1.486 0.190 
Utility ratio ρ    1.683 0.430 
Loglikelihood  -1141.7  -1143.4  
 
 It is interesting to compare our results with the evidence from the Leyden School. To this 
end, it is useful to use the result of Corollary 3. Given that 0τ → , Corollary 3 implies that  
(19) log( ( ) ) log logj j j j jY u u s t I
σ σγ σ θ σ σ θ
α α
− = − = + − ,  
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where log ( )j juθ η=  and 
 
6
log( exp( )).j k
k j
s d
=
= − −∑  
Moreover, Corollary 3 implies that  
 ( ) exp( exp( ))jP x xθ ≤ = − −  
for x R∈ . It is well known that in this case, 0.5772ijEθ =  (Euler's constant) and 2var / 6ijθ π= . The 
relation (19) is similar to the corresponding empirical relation in the Leyden School approach apart 
from the subsistence level γ  and the distributional properties of the error term. Our distributional 
assumptions also constrain the expenditure function{ }( )Y u to be nondecreasing with probability one. 
Moreover, the random effect W (cf. Corollary 2) implies that the respective increments in 
expenditures, for a given individual become correlated. From the estimates in Table 3, we find that the 
coefficient /tσ α , associated with logI is estimated to be 0.252 with standard error approximately 
equal to 0.03. In the Leyden School approach estimates of this coefficient range from 0.53 to 0.68; see 
van Hervaarden and Kapteyn (1977), Table 4. Thus, our estimate of the preference drift parameter is 
significantly lower than the ones obtained by the Leyden School.  
8. Testable properties of the model 
Let  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }( )1 2 6 6 1 2 6, ,..., log , ,...,t t t jF y y y G y I y I y I aσ σ σγ γ γ= − ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + , 
where G6 is given in (17) with 0τ = . It follows that  
(20) ( ) ( )6 1/1 2 6
1
, ,..., expj j
j
F y y y y d
α
σ
=
⎛ ⎞
= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ .  
We note that F is independent of I and { }ja , and hence becomes equal for all households. 
Furthermore, define 
 
 component
( ) 0,...,0, , ,...,
th
j
j
F y F y y y
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, 
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for 1 6j≤ ≤ . The function ( )jF y  has the interpretation  
 
( )
( ) log jj t
Y u
F y P y
I σ
γ⎛ ⎞= − − >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
It follows from (20) that  
(21) ( )
161
1 2 6
1
, ,... j j
j
F y y y A y σα
=
=∑ ,   
and  
(22) 
1 1
( )j k
k j
F y y Aα σ
≥
= ∑ ,  
where exp( ).j jA d= −  From (22) we get that  
 
1 1 1 1 16 6 6 6
1 1
1 1 2 1
( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ,j j j j j j j j j
j j j j
A y F y F y F y F yσ α α α α+ −
= = = =
= − = −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   
which combined with (21) yields 
(23) ( ) ( ) ( )1 16 611 2 6 1
2 1
, ,... j j j j
j j
F y y y F y F yα αα
−
= =
= −∑ ∑ . 
Recall that when s is known then 1 2 6( , , )F y y yL  and ( )jF y are observable. In this case, (23)implies a 
testable property, namely that (23) must hold for some positive constant α ≤ 1. When { }ja , σ and α  
have been estimated one can also use (21) to test the model. Analogous to (23), (21) implies that 
1/
1 2 6( , , )F y y y
αL is linear and additive separable in 
1
, 1,2,...,6j jA y Jσ = . Furthermore we get from 
(22) 
(24) ( ) 6log ( ) log( ) log .j k
k j
F y y a Aα
σ
=
⎛ ⎞
= + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
It also follows that  
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(25) 
6
1
log ( ) log( ) ,j
j
F y y Qα
σ
=
⎛ ⎞
= +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
where 
6 6
1
log .k
j k j
Q A
α
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟
= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑  
 
Figure 1.  Plot of K(y) against ln(y) 
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Motivated by (25), a check of the model fit can be obtained by plotting 
 ( ) ( )6
1
logr j r
j
K y F y
=
⎛ ⎞
≡ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
against log( )ry , for suitable ry , r=1,2, M.L  We have plotted ( )K y  against log(y), which is shown 
in Figure 1. As we can see, the plot does not deviate much from a linear relationship between ( )K y  
and log( )y , which means that our model fits the data quite well. Since this sample is rather small, we 
have not tried to construct tests based on (21) and (23).  
9. Measuring the utility of changes in income 
As mentioned in the introduction and discussed at length in Ellingsen (1994), several authors have 
discussed the concept of marginal utility of income. This concept is intrinsically linked to the concept 
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of cardinal utility. What seems to have been overlooked in the literature is that economists have 
implicitly assumed utility to be additive when they discuss cardinal utility. For example, when Frisch 
postulated his interlocal choice axioms (Frisch, 1926), he assumed implicitly that changes in utility 
were represented as utility differences. However, there are no a priori theoretical reasons why changes 
in utility should be represented as utility differences rather than utility ratios. Now consider the setting 
of this paper. Suppose there are two multiplicatively separable random utility representations 
{ ( , )U j y% } and { *( , )U j y% } where ( , ) ( , ) ( , )U j y v j y j yε=% %% and * * *( , ) ( , ) ( , )U j y v j y j yε=% %% , that yield 
the same choice probabilities. Then it follows from Yellott (1977), Theorem 3, that 
(26) *( , ) ( , )
d bU j y aU j y=% %  
where 
d
=  means equality in distribution and a and b are arbitrary positive constants7. Thus we 
conclude from (26) that our family of utility functions is represented on a so-called log interval scale, 
see Falmagne (1985) for a definition of different scale types. It is a random scale due to the stochastic 
error term. From (26) it follows moreover that when aggregating over the discrete goods, the random 
utility of income {U(y)} is also represented as a random log interval scale. This also implies that the 
average scale v(y) is also represented as a log interval scale. Now define **( ) log ( )U y U y= . As 
mentioned above, the utility function **( )U y  is completely equivalent to U(y) in the sense that it can 
also be used as a scale that measures changes. The only difference is that **( )U y  yields an interval 
scale representation instead of a log interval scale one. Similarly, the representative scale v(y) is 
transformed to an interval scale log ( )v y .  
 Consider next scale representation of changes in incomes. The following result is useful 
in the context of interpreting utility ratios. 
 
 Corollary 4 
 Assume that the assumptions of Theorem 2 hold. Then for 2 1y y> , 
(27) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 2
1 2
1 1
max 1 ( , ) ,1
b b
b
U y v y
Z y yU y v y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟=
−⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
,  
where Z(y1,y2) is a positive random variable with c.d.f.  
                                                     
7 The only difference between Yellott's formulation and ours is that he assumes an additive utility representation while we 
use a multiplicative one. These two representations are of course completely equivalent since the additive representation is 
obtained from the multiplicative one by taking logarithm of the multiplicative utility representation. 
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 1 2( ( , ) ) /(1 )P Z y y z z z≤ = +   
for z>0, Moreover, 
(28) 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
1
1
if  1 
if 1 
b v y
M bU y
E v y
U y
b
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ <⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟ ⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎜ ⎟ ⎪⎝ ⎠
∞ ≥⎩
, 
where M(x) is a positive function that is strictly increasing. 
 
 Also, we have the following result,  
 
 Corollary 5 
 Suppose , 1,2,3,4jy jγ> = , are incomes that satisfy 2 1( ) / ( )v y v y < 4 3( ) / ( )v y v y . Then 
2 1( ) / ( )U y U y is stochastically dominated by 4 3( ) / ( )U y U y , i.e., for q > 1, 
 42
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( )( )
( )( )
U yU y qqP P
U yU y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ≤≤ > ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
 
 The proofs of Corollaries 4 and 5 are given in the Appendix. 
 
 The result of Corollary 5 shows that when 2 1( ) / ( )v y v y < 4 3( ) / ( )v y v y , a population of 
consumers will, on average, assign higher value to 4 3( ) / ( )U y U y  than to 2 1( ) / ( )U y U y . The results of 
Corollary 4 and 5 demonstrate that the c.d.f. of the utility ratio depends on 1 2( , )y y  through 
2 1( ) / ( )v y v y . If we take the logarithm transformation of the corresponding utility ratios we obtain 
results that are completely analogous to the results of Corollaries 4 and 5, where the relevant c.d.f. in 
this case depends on the logarithm of the ratios of the representative utilities. Thus, on the individual 
level, the utility ratios can be transformed to perfectly equivalent utility differences. Similarly, on the 
aggregate level the ratios of the representative utilities transforms to corresponding representative 
utility differences. Thus, we have demonstrated that Theorem 1 yields either an interval scale utility 
representation or an equivalent log interval scale representation. Torgerson (1961, pp.202-203) and 
Narens (1996, pp. 117-118) have reached a similar conclusion. In fact Narens (1996) provides a 
theoretical basis for the empirical findings of Torgerson (1961). When utility is represented either on a 
log interval scale or on an interval scale we shall say that we have a weak cardinal representation. 
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When utility is solely represented on an interval scale we shall say that we have a strong (interval 
scale) cardinal representation. When utility is solely represented on a ratio scale we shall say that we 
have a strong (ratio scale) representation. In the present context, weak cardinality is actually all we 
need because it enables us to rank both levels and differences, in contrast to an ordinal scale. However, 
in the context of choice under uncertainty and expected utility theory we need strong (interval scale) 
cardinality. 
 As demonstrated above, our weak cardinal scale allows both an individual random scale 
as well as a deterministic average scale representation that both are weakly cardinal. Hence, this 
setting allows us to rank levels and differences both on the individual as well as on the aggregate level. 
 In psychophysics, as in economics, the concept of cardinality seems to be controversial. 
For example, the school of Stevens claims that the power function representation is the appropriate 
strong (ratio scale) cardinal psychophysical law, of which utility of income is a special case. In the 
literature, several researchers have disagreed with Stevens on this matter; see for example Shepard 
(1981). Recall that in the typical experimental settings described in section 2, such as for example 
Magnitude estimation, the subjects have proven to be able to "produce" numbers on a ratio scale that 
matches changes in intensities of stimuli. To us it therefore seems plausible that Fechner's logarithm 
law and Steven's power law can at least allow the interpretation of scales that can measure utility of 
changes. This is possible if we interpret these laws as weakly cardinal.  
 As regards to a marginal utility concept one cannot apply the conventional definition to 
the random utility function of income simply because U(y) is not differentiable with respect to y. This 
is seen immediately from (7). One can, however, define the corresponding aggregate marginal utility. 
From (28) and (A.89) in the Appendix, if follows that  
(29) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )2 1
2 1 1 1
1
2 1 1 1 1
lim lim '( )
1
b b
by y x
U y U y bv y v yE M x
by y U y v y v y→ →
⎛ ⎞
− ′ ′⎜ ⎟ = ⋅= ⋅⎜ ⎟
−
−⎝ ⎠
. 
Alternatively, we can choose to use the equivalent interval scale representation in which case one get:  
(30) 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1 1
2 1 2 1 1
log log log log ( )
lim lim
y y y y
bE U y bE U y b v y b v y v y
b
y y y y v y→ →
′
− −
= =
− −
. 
From (29) and (30) we see that whether we use the log interval or the interval scale representation the 
aggregate marginal utility concept introduced above is only determined up to a multiplicative constant 
(b/(1-b) or b). Moreover, we notice that (29) and (30) are equivalent (equal apart from a multiplicative 
constant). Let ω( (y) denote the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with respect to income, 
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which Frisch (1959) called the money flexibility. An immediate consequence of (29) and (30) is that 
the elasticities of the two versions of the aggregate marginal utility of income are equal.  
 
 Corollary 6 
 Assume a weakly cardinal representation, i.e., a log interval or an interval random scale 
representation consistent with Theorem 1. Then the aggregate marginal utility function is uniquely 
defined by 
(31) ( )log '( ) ( )( )
log
d v y v y
y
d y
ω =
(   
for y γ> .  
 
 From (31) and (8), we obtain that 
(32) 1
1( )
1
y
y
τ
ω
γ −
−
= −
−
(   
for y γ> . Because τ≤1 and γ≤y, the money flexibility is negative, it approaches -∞ when y→γ and  
(τ-1) when y→∞. Recall that our estimation results suggest that τ  is close to zero. 
 From (32) we observe that ω(  declines with income, as Frisch (1959) suggested. Hence 
ω
(  becomes infinitely large when y approaches γ (the subsistence level) and it approaches 1 (τ=0) 
when y increases toward large values. 
 In his well known article on consumer demand Frisch (1959) presented a complete 
scheme for computing all direct and cross demand elasticities. He employed a deterministic additive 
separable utility function, where each element gave the utility of a good. Based on this separability 
assumption, (by Frisch called want-independence), he demonstrated that all elasticities with respect to 
price could be deduced from the knowledge of budget proportions and Engel (income) elasticities. The 
money flexibility, ω( , had an essential role in the formulas for these elasticities. 
 Johansen (1960) provides the first example of a computable general equilibrium model 
(CGE) in economics. It was estimated and calibrated on Norwegian data. Based on demand data for 
different goods he used the approach of Frisch (1959) and obtained very similar results for the 
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different goods8. The estimates of ω(  varied from –1.85 to –2.13 and Johansen concluded that the 
compromise value should be –1.89, which he then also used in his CGE-model.   
 Frisch concluded that ω( was equal to –2 for the median part of the population (the middle 
class), in absolute values much higher for the poor and very small for the rich.  
 
Table 4. Summary statistics, Norwegian Households with Positive Disposable Household  
Income, 1995 
 Mean Std Minimum Maximum 
Family size 2.23 1.30 1  12 
# children less than 6 0.22 0.55 0    4 
# children between 7 and 15 0.25 0.60 0    5 
# children above 16 0.05 0.23 0    3 
Income (100 000 NOK) 2.33 1.95 0.37 114 
Debt (100 000 NOK) 3.16 6.12 0 306 
# of observations 1 902 367    
 
 We have simulated the distribution of ω( (y) based on a large population that is 
representative for the population of Norway. The summary statistics of the population used is given in 
Table 4. We find the mean of ω( is equal to -1.7, which is quite close to the number suggested by 
Frisch and Johansen. The distribution of the predicted ω(  (with γ=30000 N ) is shown in Figure 2. 
 
                                                     
8 The formula for ω( used in Frisch (1959) was ( )1 /( )E E e Er r r rr r rω α α= − +( where Er, αr and err are the income elasticity, 
budget share and direct price elasticity for commodity r, respectively. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the Money Flexibility 
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10. Relations to Demand Theory 
We shall now discuss briefly some implications from the above analysis for consumer demand 
systems. Recall that since our theory implies a stochastic utility function the corresponding demand 
system will be stochastic. Conventional methods based on duality theory (Roy’s identity) will not 
work here because the random error term in the utility function depends on income and prices. A more 
general and rigorous treatment can be made by applying the approach of Dagsvik (1994). This would, 
however, be beyond the scope of the present paper. Here we shall therefore ignore the random term in 
the utility function. Provided 0τ → , the corresponding “representative” utility is, apart from a power 
transformation, equal to the utility function ( ),U y p  given by 
(33) ( ) ( )1/ ( ), ( ) ( ) t pU y p y p p Iσγ κ= − >  
where p denotes a vector of prices, y denotes income and I will be interpreted as the real income 
lagged one year. As discussed above the variable I implies a “drift” in the utility function. Note that 
the parameter ( )pκ κ=>  that appears in (8) and may depend on prices, is absorbed into the constants aj 
in the likelihood function. In principal, the parameter σ may also depend on prices. Below we only 
consider the case with constantσ . Note that ( )pκ and ( )t pI must be homogenous of degree σ− in 
prices. Given that σ  is a constant, we observe from (33) that our indirect utility function belongs to 
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the class of functional forms called "Gorman-Polar" form (Gorman (1953)). Applying Roy's 
identity ( , )U y p  we get the following demand system 
 ( ) ( ) log ( )( ) ( ) ; 1,..., ,( )k kk k
p I t px p y p k K
p
κγ σ γ
κ
⎛ ⎞
+ ⋅= − − =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  for y γ>  
where kx  is the consumption of good k, 1,k K= L , and ( )k pκ  and ( )k pγ  are the derivative of ( )pκ  
and ( )pγ  with respect to the price of good k. It is beyond the scope of the present article to discuss 
how ( )pκ  and ( )pγ  vary with prices. We notice that the Engel equations implied by (33) are linear in 
income y. However, due to the effect of preference drift, represented by the logarithm of income 
lagged one year, one may falsely interpret empirical evidence from panel data as an indication of 
nonlinear Engel functions because lagged income typically is highly correlated with current income. 
The derivation of the demand relations in the more general case when σ depends on prices is similar. 
In particular, when ( ) 0k pγ =  and ,σ κ have suitable functional forms we obtain the AIDS model. 
11. Conclusion 
Utility theory represents a fundamental part of microeconomic theory. Yet, few researchers address 
the issue of establishing a theoretical framework for characterizing and measuring utility as a 
stochastic process in income. 
 In this paper we have proposed a set of behavioral axioms from which we derived a 
characterization of the utility of income, viewed as a stochastic process in income. Specifically, it 
turns out that the implied utility function is an extremal process. 
 Subsequently, we have specified an empirical model for the distribution of the utility of 
income process based on the theoretical characterization, and we have applied SP data to estimate the 
unknown parameters of the model. We demonstrate that the estimated model fits the data rather well. 
Within the framework developed in this paper the empirical results show that the utility function is 
consistent with the power law established by Stevens (1975). We discussed the concept of cardinality 
and marginal utility of income in our setting. We also demonstrated how our utility of income model 
can be employed to yield a consumer demand system. 
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Appendix 
 
 To prove Theorem 1, it will be convenient to prove the following Lemma first. 
 
 Lemma 2 
 Let ( )1 2,jF u u  be the joint c.d.f. of ( ) ( )( )1 2, , ,U j y U j y% %  for income level 1 2y y< , if 
Condition 1and Axioms 1 to 3 hold, then  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2 2 1 2
exp , , ,
,
exp , .
j
v j y u v j y v j y u for u u
F u u
v j y u for u u
− −
−
⎧
− − − ≤⎪
= ⎨
− >⎪⎩
 
 
 Proof of Lemma 2:  
 By Axiom 1, Fj is a bivariate extreme value (Fréchet) c.d.f. (See Resnick for a description 
of multivariate extreme value c.d.f.). Recall that in this case Fj has the property 
(A.34) ( ) 1 21 2 1log , log ,j j u uF u u Fz z z
⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
for any 1 20, 0, 0z u u> > > . The marginal c.d.f. of ( )1,U j y% and ( )2,U j y% are equal to 
(A.35) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )12 2 2 2 2, , exp ,jP U j y u F u v j y u−≤ = ∞ = −% ,  
and  
(A.36) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )11 1 1 1 1, , exp ,jP U j y u F u v j y u−≤ = ∞ = −% .  
By Lemma 1, p. 827, in Dagsvik (2002) the left and right derivatives ( )1 2, ,j kF u u u+∂ ∂  
, ( )1 2, , 1,2j kF u u u k−∂ ∂ =  exist and are non-decreasing. From now on the notion “derivative” will 
mean the (first order) right derivative. 
 Define 
(A.37) 1( ) log ,1j ju F u
ϕ ⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠   
for 0u ≥ . By (A.34) we have, with 2z u= ,  
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(A.38) ( ) 1 21 2 2
1
log ,j j
uF u u u
u
ϕ− ⎛ ⎞= − ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
.  
Let r∂  denote the partial derivative with respect to component r, 1,2r = . We get from (A.38) that 
(A.39) ( ) 2 21 1 2 1
1
log ,j j
uF u u u
u
ϕ− ⎛ ⎞′∂ = ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
  
and  
(A.40) ( ) 2 1 12 22 1 2 2 1 2
1 1
log ,j j j
u uF u u u u u
u u
ϕ ϕ− − −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞′∂ = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
.  
Let J(y) denote the choice, given income y. We have that 
(A.41) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 2
1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2
2, 1, max , ,
(1, ) (2, ), 2, 1, ,
(1, ) , (2, ) , , 2, 1, ,
k
x
P J y J y U k y u u u
P U y U y U y U y u u u
P U y x U y x x dx U y U y u u u dx
= = ∈ + ∆
= < < ∈ + ∆
= < ∈ + < ∈ + ∆∫
%
% % % %
% % % %
  
Due to the assumption of independent utilities across alternatives the above integral reduces to 
(A.42) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
2 1 1 2
0
1, , 1, , 2, , , 2,
, , ( ).
x
P U y x U y u u u P U y x x dx U y u
u F x u F x u dx o u
∞
< ∈ + ∆ ∈ + <
= ∆ ∂ ∂ + ∆
∫
∫
% % % %
  
From (A.38), (A.39) and (A.40) it follows that 
(A.43) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2
0 0
1 2 1 1 2
1 2 1 1 2
0
, , , , log , log ,
exp .
F x u F x u dx F x u F x u F x u F x u dx
u u u u uu u x u x dx
x x x x x
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∞ ∞
∞
− − − − −
∂ ∂ = ⋅ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
′ ′= − + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∫ ∫
∫
 
Let 
(A.44) 1 2( ) ( ) ( )z z zϕ ϕ ϕ= + . 
When we combine (A.42), (A.43) and make the change of variable 1x uw−= , in the last integral we 
obstain  
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(A.45) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2
3 1
2 1 1
0
2, 1,max , ,
exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
kP J y J y U k y u u u
u u u w w w w w dw o uϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∞
− −
= = ∈ + ∆
′ ′= ∆ − − + ∆∫
%
 
Let { }max : '( ) 0b w wϕ= = , that is, b is the largest w for which ( ) 0wϕ′ = . If there is no such w 
satisfying the condition '( ) 0wϕ = , then 0.b = Since ( )j wϕ′  is non-decreasing, it must be true that 
( ) 0j wϕ′ =  for w b≤ . Hence, (0 ) ( ) 0j j bϕ ϕ′ ′+ = =  so that (0) ( )j j bϕ ϕ= . Thus (A.45) can be rewritten 
as  
(A.46) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1 2 2
3 1
2 1 1
2, 1,max , ,
exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
k
b
P J y J y U k y u u u
u u u w w w w w dw o uϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∞
− −
= = ∈ + ∆
′ ′= ∆ − − + ∆∫
%
  
On the other hand, from Axiom 2 it follows that 
(A.47) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 2 2
1 2 2
2, 1,max , ,
2, 1 max , ,
k
k
P J y J y U k y u u u
P J y J y P U k y u u u
= = ∈ + ∆
= = = ∈ + ∆
%
%                    
In the following, it turns out to be convenient to define  
(A.48) ( ) ( )( )1 2, / ( )ijC P J y i J y j bϕ= = = .                                                     
Note furthermore that 
(A.49) 
( ) ( )( )
( )( )( )
( )
2
1 2
1 2 1 2
1 2
max , ,
exp (0) (0) (0) (0) ( )
exp ( ) ( ) ( ).
kP U k y u u u
u u u o u
u b b u u o u
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
− −
− −
∈ + ∆
= − + + ∆ + ∆
= − ∆ + ∆
%
                          
From (A.46), (A.47) and (A.49), when u∆  goes to zero, we obtain that,  
(A.50) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 21exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp ( )
b
w w w w w dw C bλ λϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ λϕ
∞
′ ′
− − = −∫                 
where 1uλ −= . Note also that 
(A.51) ( ) ( )exp ( ) exp ( ) ( )
b
b w w dwλϕ λ λϕ ϕ
∞
′
− = −∫ .                                          
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Consequently, (A.50) is equivalent to 
(A.52) ( ) ( ) ( )2 1 1 21exp ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) exp ( ) ( )
b b
w w w w w dw C w w dwλϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ λϕ ϕ
∞ ∞
′ ′ ′
− − = −∫ ∫   
for 0λ ≥ . 
 Recall furthermore that ( )wϕ  is strictly increasing and differentiable for w b> . The 
uniqueness property of the Laplace transform therefore implies that the integrands in both sides of 
(A.52) must be equal, i.e., 
(A.53) ( )2 1 1 21( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w w w w Cϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ′ ′− = .                                           
Similarly, it follows by symmetry that  
(A.54) ( )1 2 2 12( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w w w w Cϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ′ ′− = .                                            
By subtracting (A.53) from (A.54) we get 
 ( )
2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 21 12
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
w w w w w w w w w w
w w w w w w w w w C C
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
− − +
′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − = − = −
 
which, when dividing by 2( )wϕ  becomes 
(A.55) 
( )12 211 1
2 2
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
w C Cw w w w
w w
ϕϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
′
−′ ′
−
= .                                     
When we integrate both sides of (A.55) we get 
 1 21 12 1
( )
( ) ( )
w C C d
w w
ϕ
ϕ ϕ
−
= +  
for w b> , where d1 is a constant. Hence 
(A.56) 1 12 21 1( ) ( )w C C d wϕ ϕ= − + .                                                   
Similarly, it follows that 
(A.57) 2 21 12 2( ) ( )w C C d wϕ ϕ= − + .                                                  
By inserting (A.56) into (A.54) we get 
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(A.58) ( )2 2 1 12( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w w w d w Cϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ′ ′− =                                          
for w b> . Since ( ) 0wϕ′ >  for w b> , (A.58) implies that 
(A.59) 122 2
1
( ) ( ) Cw w w
d
ϕ ϕ′− = .                                                     
Similarly, we get that 
(A.60) 211 1
2
( ) ( ) Cw w w
d
ϕ ϕ′− = .                                                     
Equations (A.59) and (A.60) are first order differential equations that have solutions of the form 
(A.61) ( )j j jw wϕ α β= +                                                          
for , 1,2,w b j> =  where αj and βj are suitable constants. Since ( ) 0j wϕ′ =  for w b≤ and ( )j wϕ′  is 
continuous it follows from (A.61) that 
(A.62) ( )j j jw bϕ α β= +                                                           
for w b≤ . As a consequence (A.38)and (A.62) yields 
(A.63) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2 1 2
log ,
.
j j
j
j j
u u for bu u
F u u
b u for bu u
β α
β α
− −
−
⎧ + ≤⎪
− = ⎨
+ >⎪⎩
                                 
We realize that (A.63) implies that 
(A.64) ( ) ( )( ) ( )12 2 12 2 1 1
2 1
exp ,
, ,
0 .
ju u buP U j y u U j y u
u bu
α −⎧ − ≥⎪≤ = = ⎨
<⎪⎩
% %                         
This means that ( ) ( )2 1, ,U j y bU j y≥% %  with probability one. So for { }( , ),U j y y γ≥%  to be 
nondecreasing one must have that 1b ≥ . If 1b >  then 2 1( , ) ( , )U j y U j y>% %  with probability one and 
then Axiom 3 cannot hold. We therefore conclude that 1b = . 
 With 1b = , we have  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 12 2 2 2 2 2, , exp( ( ) ) exp ,j j jP U j y u F u u v j y uβ α − −≤ = ∞ = − + = −% , 
and  
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11 1 1 1 1 1, , exp( ) exp ,j jP U j y u F u u v j y uβ − −≤ = ∞ = − = −% . 
This shows that ( ) ( )2 1, ,j v j y v j yα = − , and ( )1,j v j yβ = . So the joint distribution can be written as 
follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
1 1
1 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2 2 1 2
exp , , , ,
,
exp , .
j
v j y u v j y v j y u for u u
F u u
v j y u for u u
− −
−
⎧
− − − ≤⎪
= ⎨
− >⎪⎩
 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 1: 
 Assume that there are only 2 alternatives 1,2j = . The arguments in the general case with 
more than 2 alternatives will be similar.  
 Let ( ){ }1 2,jV y y  be random variables with c.d.f. 
 
( ) ( )( )2 1, ,exp v j y v j y
u
⎛ ⎞
−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
for 0u > , and with the property that ( )1 2,jV y y  is independent of ( )1 2,jV y y′ ′  for 1 2 1 2,y y y y′ ′< <  
provided [ ] [ ]1 2 1 2, ,y y y y′ ′∩ = ∅ . Define 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )* *2 1 1 2, max , , ,jU j y U j y V y y= . 
Then it follows that ( ) ( )( )* *1 2, , ,U j y U j y  has joint c.d.f. as in Lemma 1 for all 1 2y yγ ≤ < . By 
Kolmogorov’s existence theorem there exists two random variables with c.d.f. as in Lemma 1 and they 
are unique with probability one. A similar result holds for more than 2 random variables indexed by 
1 2 .dy y yγ ≤ < < <L  With the equivalence of finite dimensional distributions, the processes 
( ){ }, ,U j y y γ≥%  and ( ){ }* , ,U j y y γ≥  are equivalent. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 2: 
 From Theorem 1 it follows for 2 1y y γ> > , that 
47 
(A.65) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 1 2 1, .P U y U y P V y y U y> = >                                   
Since ( )1 2,V y y  and ( )1U y  are independent and Fréchet distributed, we get from standard results in 
discrete choice theory that 
(A.66) 
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
2 1 1 2 1
1 1
1 2 1 2
( ( ) ( )) 1 ,
1 1
P U y U y P V y y U y
v y v y
v y v y v y v y
> = − <
= − = −
+ −
                             
for 2 1y y γ≥ ≥ . When we combine (A.65) and (A.66) we realize that Axiom 4 implies that whenever 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
*
11
*
2 2
v yv y
v y v y
>  
then 
 
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
*
11
*
2 2
v yv y
v y v y
λ γ γλ γ γ
λ γ γ λ γ γ
− +
− +
>
− +
− +
 
for 2 1y y γ≥ ≥ , * *2 1y y γ≥ ≥  and 0λ > . Now we can apply Theorem 14.19 in Falmagne (1985), p. 
338, which yields9 
(A.67)    ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 21 2 1 1 2 1
2
1 1
1 ,
y yv y
F P U y U y P V y y U y
v y
τ τδ γ δ γ
τ
⎛ ⎞
− − − − −⎜ ⎟
= = − > = <⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
for 2 1y y γ≥ ≥ , where 1 2, 0, 0τ δ δ> >  are constants and F(⋅) is a continuous and strictly increasing 
mapping. Evidently, F(⋅) is defined on ]( ,0−∞ . When 2 1y y=  we obtain that 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
1 2 1 1
1
1
1 (0)
y v y
F F
v y
τδ δ γ
τ
⎛ ⎞
− − −⎜ ⎟
= = =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
                                                     
9 Note that Theorem 14.19, p.338, in Falmagne (1985) can be expressed more compactly as 
  ( ) ( ) ( )1 2a 1 b 1M a, b F
θ θδ − + δ −
=
θ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
where 0(x 1) / 0−  is defined as ( )
0
lim x 1 log xθ
θ→
− θ = . 
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must hold, for all 1y γ≥ . This implies that 1 2δ δ δ= =  (say). 
 Let 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 2 11 1 1 1
,
y y a y
x z
τ τ τ τδ γ δ γ δ γ δ γ
τ τ
− − − − − − − − − −
= =  
where ( )1,a yγ∈  is fixed. From (A.67) we get 
(A.68) ( ) ( )2
( )v a F x z
v y
= +                                                          
and 
(A.69) ( ) ( )1
( ) .v a F z
v y
=                                                             
When (A.68) and (A.69) are combined with (A.67) we get 
(A.70) ( ) ( ) ( )F x z F x F z+ = .                                                     
Eq. (A.70) is a Cauchy functional equation which only continuous solution is the exponential function. 
Consequently, for y γ≥ , 
(A.71) 
( )( )1
log ( ) .
y
v y
τβ γ
τ
− −
=                                                  
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 3: 
 From (A.65) and (A.66) we get that for y2 >y1>γ 
(A.72) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1
2 1
2
1 .
v y
P U y U y
v y
> = −                                            
Hence, Axiom 5 implies that 
(A.73) 
( )( )
( )( )
( )
( )
2 2
11
v y v y
v yv y
λ γ γ
λ γ γ
− +
=
− +
                                                
for all 0λ > . For simplicity, let 
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( )
( )( ) 1
v x
g x
v
γ
γ
+
=
+
 
for 1x ≥ . With 1 21,y y xγ γ= + = + , we get from (A.73) that 
(A.74) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1.g x g x g xλ λ= ≥                                                          
Eq. (A.74) is a functional equation of the Cauchy type which only continuous solution is the power 
function 
(A.75) ( )g x xδ=                                                                  
for some constant δ. Since 
( ) ( )( ) 1v y g y vγ γ= − +  
the result of Theorem 3 follows. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 4: 
 Let ( )i i iW yξ ε= . Then we can write 
(A.76) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )maxi i i i r rr Ar r
r A
W v y
E P v y v y
W v y
ξ ξ
∈
∈
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟
= =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑
.                                
Since the error terms { }iξ  are independent, we know from Yellott (1977) that Axiom 6 (IIA) can only 
be satisfied if the errors { }iξ  are Fréchet distributed, i.e., 
(A.77) ( ) ( )exp aiP x xξ −≤ = −                                                         
for 0x > , where a is a positive constant. But (A.77) implies that 
(A.78) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) exp ii i i i i i i
i
WxP x P W y x E P y W E
W x
ξ ε ε⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞≤ = ≤ = ≤ = −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
.                    
The last equality in (A.78) follows because by assumption ( ) ( )( ) exp 1P y x xε ≤ = − . When we 
combine (A.77) and (A.78) we obtain that under the normalization in (12)for any 0λ >  
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(A.79) ( ) ( )exp expiE W αλ λ− = − .                                                      
The left hand side of (A.79) is the Laplace transform of the distribution of Wi. From Samorodnitsky 
and Taqqu (1994) Proposition 1.2.12, p. 15, it follows that (A.79) holds Wi must be a strictly α-stable 
random variable that is totally skew to the right and with 1α < . 
  Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Theorem 5: 
 For the sake of simplicity consider first the case with 2m =  and 1W = . In this case it 
follows that 
(A.80) 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2
, ,
, ,max , ,
min , , , min , , .
G y y P U Y u U y U Y u U y
P u U y u U y P U y u U y V y y u
P U y u u V y y u P U y u u P V y y u
= ≥ ≥
= ≥ ≥ = ≤ ≤
= ≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤
   
From Corollary 1 and (A.80) we obtain that 
(A.81) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 12 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2, exp max , .G y y v y u u v y v y u− − −= − − −                       
In particular, when 2 1u u≥ , (A.81) reduces to 
(A.82) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 12 1 2 1 1 2 2 2, exp .G y y v y u u v y u− − −= − − −                                  
The multivariate case is completely analogous. It follows readily that when 1 2 ... mu u u≤ ≤ ≤ , 
1 2 ... my y y≤ ≤ ≤ , 
(A.83) ( ) ( ) ( )( )11 1 11 2 1
1
, ,..., exp .
m
m m m m j j j
j
G y y y v y u v y u u
−
− − −
+
=
⎛ ⎞
= − − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑                          
For 1 2 ... mu u u≤ ≤ ≤  and 1 2 ... my y y< < < , the corresponding joint density function equals 
(A.84) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )11 1 11 2 1 2 1
1
, ,..., , ,..., .
m
m m m m m m j j j
j
g y y y G y y y v y u u u v y
−
− − −
+
=
′ ′= −∏                   
The general case with random W now follows readily from (A.83) and (A.84). 
 Hence, the proof is complete. 
Q.E.D. 
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 Proof of Corollary 3: 
 From Theorem 5 and (14) we get that  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
1
1/
1 1/
( ) exp ( ) exp ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
P Y u y E Wv y u u v y
P u u v y P u u v y
P v u u y
α α
α α α
α
η η
η
−
−
> = = −
= > = >
= >
 
where ( )uη is exponentially distributed with parameter one. Hence 1 1/( ( ) )v u u αη−  has the same c.d.f. 
as Y(u) and this implies that v(Y(u)) has the same c.d.f. as 1/( )u u αη .  
Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Corollary 4: 
 We have from (7) that 
(A.85) ( )( )
2 1 2
1 1
( , )max 1,
( )
b bU y V y y
U y U y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
.                                                
Note that ( )1 2,V y y  and ( )1U y  are independent Fréchet distributed 1exp( )kx−− , x>0 with parameter 
k equal to ( ) ( )2 1v y v y−  and ( )1v y , respectively. Hence, from standard results in discrete choice 
theory we get that (for 0q > ): 
(A.86) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 11 2 1 2
1,
, 1 ,
qP V y y qU y
q K y y q K y y−
≤ = =
+ +
                           
where 
(A.87) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 1
1 2
1
,
v y v y
K y y
v y
−
=                                                    
Hence, (A.86) implies that we can write  
 1 2 1 2 1 2
1
( , )
( , ) ( , )
( )
b
b bV y y K y y Z y y
U y
⎛ ⎞
=⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ , 
where 1 2( , )Z y y  is a positive random variable with c.d.f. 1 2 1
1( ( , ) )
1
P Z y y z
z−
≤ =
+
 for z 0. 
 Hence ,  
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(A.88) 
( )
( ) ( )2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 21 1max( ( , ) ( , ) ,1) 1 ( , ) ( , )
b
b b bU yE E K y y Z y y P K y y Z y y q dq
U y
∞⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ = = + >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∫ . 
By using the change of variable 1 2( , )
b bq K y y x→ , and using (A.87) we get 
(A.89) 
( )
( ) 1
1 2
2 12
1 2
1 1 ( , )
( )1 ( 1) ( ( , ) )
( )
b
b b
K y y
U y v yE b x P Z y y x dx
U y v y
−
∞
−
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎢ ⎥ = + − >⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
∫ .                             
Clearly, the right hand side of (A.89) is strictly increasing in 2 1( ) / ( )v y v y and it exists when b<1 and is 
equal to infinity for b 1. 
Q.E.D. 
 
 Proof of Corollary 5: 
 From Corollary 4 and (A.86), we get that when 1q ≥  
(A.90) 1/
( ) ( , ) 1
( ) ( ) 1 ( , )
b b
j i j
b
i i i j
U y V y y
P q P q
U y U y K y y q−
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟≤ = ≤ =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Since K(yi,yj) is increasing as a function of ( ) / ( )j iv y v y , it follows that 
( )
( )
b
j
i
U y
P q
U y
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟≤⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 is 
decreasing as a function of ( ) / ( )j iv y v y . Hence, the result of the corollary follows.  
Q.E.D. 
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